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RUTH M. HILTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ROLLIN L.
McNITT, as Executor, etc., Defendant and Appellant.
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[1] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Duration.-The husband's obligation for support of a former wife is an obligation growing
out of the marital relationship; such obligation would, without
reference to any property settlement agreement or divorce
decree, normally cease on the husband's death subject only
to the wife's rights under the community property laws, and
in the event of a divorce and the wife's remarriage the obliga·
tion for her support would normally fall on the then husband.
[2] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Duration.-Under Civ. Code, § 139.
as amended in 1951, specifically declaring that "Except as
otherwise agreed by the parties in writing" the obligation
of the husband shall cease on his death or on remarriage of
the wife, provisions in a property settlement agreement or in
a divorce decree for support and maintenance terminate on
death or remarriage whether or not the property settlement
agreement is integrated and insevera ble, where neither the
agreement nor the decree provides that the support payments
are to continue beyond the obligor's death or the obligee's remarriage, and the wife may recover only the amount that was
due lind owing prior to decedent's death.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Interest.-Judgments ordinarily
bear interest at the statutory rate, but only after an order
for payment is an executor obliged to pay any general claim
against the estate (Prob. Code, §§ 951, 952), and it is only after
such order is made that it bears interest at the statutory rate.
[4] ld. - Claims - Interest. - A former wife presenting a claim
against her deceased husband's estate, based on a property
settlement agreement lind a divorce decree, is entitled to
interest at the statutory rate on the amount owed at the time
of decedent's death only after the executor has been ordered
to pay her claim.

APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, .Judge. Reversed.
[2] Death of husband as affecting alimony, notes, 18 A.L.R. 1040;
101 A.L.R. 323; 39 A.L.R.2d 1046. See also CaI.Jur.2d, Divorce and
Separation, § 221.
[3] See Ca1.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 612; Am.
Jur., Executors< and Administrators, § 408.
!ricK. Dig. References: [1,2] Divorce, § 214; [3,4] Decedents'
Estates, § 506.
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Action on a claim against an estate. Judgment for plaintiff
reversed.
Glenn R. Watson and Robert G. Beverly for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Edythe Jacobs for Def('noant and Appellant.
CARTER, J .-This is an appeal from a judgment allowing
and establishing a creditor's claim for $7.500 filed by Ruth M.
Hilton against the estate of her deceased husband. Hal H.
Hilton, based on a property settlement agreement entered into
between them and on an award made in an interlocutory decree
of divorce. The executor of the husband's estate. Rollin L.
McNitt and the claimant both appeal. Mrs. Hilton's appeal is
only on the denial of interest on her claim.
The major point involved on this appeal is the effect of the
1951 amendment to section 139 of the Civil Code. The portIun
of that amendment here involved provides, that "Except as
otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the obligation of
any party in any decree, judgment, or order for the support
and maintenance of the other party shall terminate upon the
death of the obligor or upon the remarriage of the other
party. "
In the case at bar the parties enter('d into a property
settlement agreement on Jaly 25, 1953, pending divorce
proceedings to be commenced by Mrs. Hilton. The agreement
provides that it is the mutual intention of the parties to
etYect a final and complete settlement of their respective property rights with reference to their marital status "to each
other." The agreement also provides that "Husband shall
pay to wife for her support and maintenance $300 a month,
payable on the first of each and every month commencing
with the lst day of August, 1953. and continuing until the
first day of July, 1956." Other provisions in the agreement
divide among the parties certain properties owned by them.
and paragraph X provides that" Each of the parties in consideration of the agreements of the other herein expressed
hereby waives, releases and relinquishes to the other all claims
each may now have, or might hereafter otherwise acquire
against the other, as husband or wife, or otherwise, arising
out of the marital relation." On the same day. the parties
entered into a "stipulation inre alimony, attorney feeR, court
costs, title and possession of property" in accord with the
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aD'plicable provisions in the property settlement agreement
and stipulated further that defendant was to pay plaintiff
"the sum of $300 per month, commencing on August 1, 1953.
and continuing thereafter on each and every month, on th~
first day of such month until the first day of July, 1956."
On the stipulation was written "Approved and so ordered"
and the signature of the trial judge. On August 21, 1953,
plaintiff was granted an interlocutory decree of divorce which
provided that "It is further ordered that defendant pay to
the plaintiff the following sums: $300 per month commencing
October 1st, 1953, and on the 1st day of each month thereafter until the 1st day of July, 1956 .... "
Mr, Hilton died about July 25, 1954, and Mrs. Hilton remarried about September 18, 1954. Mrs. Hilton presented a
creditor's claim for 25 monthly installments of $300 (a total
of $7,500) beginning on July 1, 1954, under both the property
settlement agreement and the interlocutory decree of divorce.
The executor approved the claim to the extent of $300 for
the support and maintenance due July 1, 1954, prior to
Hilton's death, and rejected the balance of the claim because
it was based on support and maintenance of Mrs. Hilton
as the former wife of the decedent and that such right terminated with Hilton's death. Mrs. Hilton filed suit against the
executor for the whole claim. The trial court held that the
contract was an integrated and inseparable part of a property
settlement agreement; that the monthly payments were installments in settlement of the parties' marital rights rather
than payments for support and maintenance. It was concluded that the obligation for the monthly payments did not
terminate upon the death of the decedent or on the remarriage
of the wife.
The executor contends that an integrated property settlement agreement is subject to section 139 of the Civil Code as
amended in 1951 and that provisions in a property settlement
agreement or in a decree for support and maintenance terminate on death or remarriage unless there is a provision in the
agreement or decree which negates the intention that the payments should so terminate. With thifl contention we agree.
[1] The husband's obligation f.-1r support of a former
wife is an obligation growing out of the marital relationship,
This obligation for support would, without reference to any
property settlement agreement, or decree of divorce, normally
cease upon the husband's death subject only to the wife's
rights under the community property laws of this state. In
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the event of a divorce and the wife's remarriage the obligatioll
for her support would. normally, fall upon the then husband.
Prior to 1951, section 139 of the Civil Code provided thaI
upon the remarriage of the wife, the husband was no 10llger
obligated for her support. This, then. was the anllounced
public policy of this state prior to 1951. The 1951 Legislature
amended section 139 so as to provide that unless the partie!>
otherwise agree in writing, the obligation of any party in any
decree, judgment, or order for the support and maintpnan('p
of the other party shall terminate upon the dpath of the
obligor or the remarriage of the obligee. As was held in Taliaferro v. Taliaferro, 125 Cal.App.2d 419, 424 [270 P.2d 1036].
"Section 139 [as it read prior to the 1951 amendment] places
no limitations upon the rights of husband and wife to contract
with each other as they please, and if the husband for adequate consideration contracts to give support beyond that
for which he is strictly obligated, he has the right to thus freely
contract with his wife. This is not being imposed upon him
by the power of the court, but is something which he undertakes voluntarily, and in the present ease, with advice of
counsel." [9] lJ:lasmuch as the amendment is speeific to the
effect that "Except as otherwise agreed by the parties ill
writing" the obligation of the husband shall cease upon his
death or the remarriage of the wife we must hold that since
neither the agreement nor the decree here provided that the
monthly support payments were to continue beyond the death
of the obligor or the remarriage of the obligee plaintiff may
not prevail except for the month which was due and owingprior to decedent's death. The agreement was executed subsequent to the 1951 amendment and the parties and their attorneys are presumed to know the law applicable to such property
settlement agreements. It would appear that had the parties
intended that Mrs. Hilton was to receive a certain sum of
money without regard to her remarriage or the obligor's death
it would have been a simple matter to make their intentions
known in the property settlement agreement. In vie'v of the
language of the amendment that "except as otherwise agreed
in writing" the payments for support and maintenance terminate upon the death of the obli~or or remarriage of the wife
we are of the opinion that such payments terminated upon
the death of the obligor.
We hold, thereforp, that the 1951 amendment to section
139 is applicable wheth('r or Il'lt tll(· rroperty settlem('llt agreement is integrated and inseverable. In other words, if
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monthly payments are provided for support and maintenance

or alimony such paymcnts will cease by force of the language
of section 139 of thc Civil Code unless the parties agree in
writing that the paYlIH'nts are to continne despite the reo
marriage of the wife or the dcath of the husband.
Mrs. Hilton claims that she is entitled to intercl:>L u11 the
judgment. Section 730 of the Probate Code provides that a
judgment against an executor conclusively establishes the
validity of the claim for the amount of the judgment and
that the executor must pay the amount ascertained to be dne.
[3] Judgments ordinarily bear interest at the statutory rate.
Howcver, only after an order for payment is the executor
obliged to pay any general claim against the estate (Prob.
Code. §§ 931, 952). This court said in Estate of Bell, 168 Cal.
253, 2G8, 259 [141 P. 1170], that" [I]t is settled by our deci.
sions that the allowance of a claim against a solvent estate is
not equivalent to an ordinary jUdgment. It is a judgment
only in a qualified sense, and does not attain the force and
dignity of an absolute judgment until an order of court is
made directing the executor or administrator to pay it. Until
then it is simply an acknowletlged debt of the estate, bearing
interest at the contraet rate. It is only after such an order
is made that it bears interest at the statutory rate." And in
Estate of Girard, 110 CaLApp.2d 203. 204 [242 P.2d 669].
the court stated that" The only question presented to us is
whether a non· interest· bearing debt of a decedent bears inter·
est at the statutory rate from the date of the allowance and
approval of the creditor's claim. We have concluded that
under the existing statutory law it does not." [4] It follows,
therefore. that plaintiff is entitled to interest at the statutory
rate on the amount owed at the time of decedent's death only
after the executor has been ordered to pay her claim.
The judgment is reversed.
Shenk, J., Schauer, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree that
the 1951 amendment to Civil Code, section 139 applies to
support provisions in an integrated agreement incorporated
in Ii. divorce decree entered subsequent to the effective date of
that amendment. Before that amendment the obligation to
support under the provisions of an integrated agreement did
not t('rminate on death or remarriage unless the agreement so
provided. (Anderson v. Mart, 47 Ca1.2d 274, 280 [303 P.2d
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.339].) If the obligation to support incorporated in a divorce
uecree was not part of an integrated agreement, it always
terminated on death or remarriage. (Civ. Code, § 139.) Thus,
there was no necessity for the 1951 amendment unless it ap·
plied to support provisions in integrated agreements.
In my opinion, however, the obligation in the present case
did not terminate on death or remarriage, for the parties
"otherwise provided." True, they did not specifically men·
tion death or remarriage, or any other contingency, but by
providing that the payments should continue until the "first
day of July, 1956" they agreed that the payments were not to
terminate for any reason before that date. By specifying that
date, they necessarily precluded any other.
I would affirm the judgment.
Gibson, C. J., and Spence, J'J concurred.
The petition of plaintiff and appellant for a rehearing and
application to augment the record were denied October 17,
1957. Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., were of the
opinion that the petition should be granted.

